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ABSTRACT
“Street Vendors : Urban Problem and Economic Potential”
Harlan Dimas
ESP FE UNPAD Bandung
Of the many trials faced by city managers in developing countries, one of the most challenging is
undoubtedly the Street Vendors (SV) problem. They are a perpetual problem for street and
sidewalk users in most Indonesian cities. Their spill-over business onto roadways is the source of
traffic congestion. Their informal setting and business refuse (garbage) cause unsightly urban
vista. However there is now a gradual shift of perspectives that focus on their economic
potentials, offering a smart city manager a host of development opportunities. Hence the current
policy of harassment and elimination of SV, as practiced by most municipalities in Indonesia, is
counter productive at best and inhuman at worst.
This paper discusses the roots of the SV phenomenon (found to be mostly economics) and
suggests several SV management solutions sampled from best practices from around the world.
Keywords : Street Vendors Management, Economic Policy, Best Practices, Local (Urban)
Economic Development
JEL Classification : P25“Street Vendors : Urban Problem and Economic Potential”*
I. Introduction
1.1 Street Vending Nomenclature
In Indonesia Street Vendors or Hawkers are termed Pedagang Kaki Lima (PKL). Itis a term
derived from an old Dutch rule on the provision of pavement/sidewalk in front of shops to ensure
safe and convenient space for pedestrian traffic. The minimum width was five feet (Lima Kaki).
Hence in Indonesia hawkers or street sellers who occupy this area are called Pedagang Kaki Lima
(Amir Sidharta, Kompas, 8/2/06). Street Vendors (SV) is further divided into mobile/dynamic,
those who visit different streets/ places during their working hours, and immobile/static SV,
those that stay on-site, having a regular/home-base (Bhowmik, 2002). Mobile SV is further
divided into fully mobile SV, the ones that keep on moving, and partially mobileSV, the ones
that have several rest/stop locations. An illustration of the latter is some sellers who sell in front
of schools early in the morning (school children arrive, school about to start) and return there
twice later in the morning and in the afternoon (school children having recess and children
released from school, school is over). Between those times the sellers visit or relocate in other
places where customers are plenty, such as markets, residential areas, office complex, etc. Static
SV at the minimum have a piece of cloth or plastic mat thrown on the ground to display their
wares (short-term markets/”pasar kaget”), but usually they grow into some semi-permanent
structure to accommodate their business. A common site is the “plastic blue tent” over (long)
wood benches and/or plastic stools (Setianto, 2007). Dynamic SV normally push carts or carry
their wares on their shoulders (“ditanggung”). According to Bhowmik (2002), women SV in
India prefer to be fully dynamic, never stop or rest too long at any one place, to avoid thugs
and/or harassments.
(See appendices for photographs of differentstreet vendors)
* Library research assistance provided by Sinta Wulansari, SEAlthough most SV are independent sellers, during these times of economic hardship in Indonesia,
some are found to be extensions (subsidiaries) of regular stores. This is the stores attempt to
compete with the regular SV. In a minority of the cases some “successful” SV may branch out
into possession of several other SV outlets (Susanti, 2007).
1.2 Street Vendors as an Urban Management Challenge
Most people hold negative images of SV/PKL. This is true for the whole world, not confined only
to Indonesians. Pedestrians are annoyed by their encroachment of sidewalks. At some places it is
difficult to walk straight. People then will have to pass the narrow aisles between seller stalls
walking sideways. When the sidewalks are too crowded people are forced to step onto the road to
walk, which is a very dangerous exercise. Drivers and other road users dislike them for their road
encroachment. For instance, the two-way traffic on four lanes of Oto Iskandar Dinata street, in
front of Pasar Baru (New Market) in Bandung, was reduced to one lane, forcing unidirectional
traffic. In some cases road encroachment is such that for practical purposes traffic ceased, such as
at ‘pasar kaget’ (surprise market) Gasibu, Bandung. Store-owners despise the PKL for their
illegal use of the shops’ front sidewalks, which the PKL then modify to suit their own needs. This
modification often involves semi permanent roof to protect their wares from the sun and rain
(usually in the form of blue/industrial plastic tents), which obstructs sun light from shining on the
stores and hampers the flow of fresh air. All this robs the sidewalk of its convenience and deters
walking traffic into the stores, hence reducing the stores’ business. Furthermore, in a minority of
cases where the PKL are selling similar goods to the shops, then the shops’ business are directly
threatened. The latter is mostly true for sellers located in (Indonesian) traditional markets (as
opposed to western style super markets). They view PKL as direct competitors and unfair
competitors at that, since PKL steal their customers out in front, before the customers enter the
market. In fact PKL oppose other PKL, rejecting government attempts to relocate them unless
other PKL were also relocated simultaneously. Otherwise they would lose business to new PKL
occupying the newly vacated spaces. (Bandung.go.id, 7/13/07).
With so much antagonism directed at them, it is no wonder that SV/PKL is seen as an urban
scourge the world over (ILO, 2006). City managers would like to eliminate them, since they
deface city sights. SV are dirty, congestive, chaotic and uncontrollable. They are unwantedelements in a carefully laid urban architecture. Hence municipal governments, both here in
Indonesia and abroad, in most developing countries, regularly apply police powers to eliminate
them. These ‘street sweepings’ (“razzia”), to clean them off SV, were usually popular, broadly
supported by the people. Even if the support was not overwhelming, since road users were
represented by private car owners, they have more political clout then SV, by virtue of being
economically stronger. Although SV are regularly “taxed” by different parties (thugs and
officials) to pay for protection or avoidance of harassment, almost none of this money ever
reaches the municipal treasury. Thus SV have no significant direct economic benefit for the
municipality. This is another reason for their harsh treatment by city managers.
In Indonesia street sweepings are done by the Administrative Enforcement Police (Satpol PP
or Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja, as opposed to the regular police, who direct traffic and catch
criminals). They mount surprise operations, catching the PKL and their wares. The wares were
either destroyed on-site or confiscated, to be returned after fines were paid, or to be destroyed
later, if the owners lack funds to pay the fines. The captured PKL were usually released after a
quick “advice” session (encouragement for relocation), or held for a short period. The municipal
government is not in a position (financially) to keep a lot of people in jails. Still, many PKL
preferred to run when faced with a street sweeping operation. So, we sometimes saw some
policemen chasing PKL on the streets. These hot pursuits often ended up with bad air. The tired
policemen became short-tempered, especially if the PKL offered verbal and/or physical resistance
to the destruction of their properties. Sometimes violence erupted to the detriment of all parties
concerned.
Regular sweeping operations breed antagonism among the PKL. This is reasonable in light of
property seizure and/or destruction. Some times PKL organized themselves to repel the sweeps
and some sweeps were cancelled due to the violent resistance. However the municipal
government would comeback later with stronger force and the PKL were swept off the streets and
sidewalks, for the time being. They always returned and the Admin Police (Satpol PP) would
have to mount another sweep. It is safe to assume that this harassment policy to deal with PKL is
counterproductive, not to say inhuman. PKL are not the only victim in the sweeping process. The
Admin Police personnel suffered also. They were ordered to perform a task that is against human
decency, that is harassing PKL who are not really criminals. They knew that the PKL were only
trying to survive. They realize that the PKL were simply attempting to feed their families. The
accumulated effects of constant sweeping operations, more so if many ended in violence, willeither breed brutality among the Admin Police personnel or make them feel alienated. Thus over
time it looks as if this harassment tactics is a no win (or lose-lose) policy.
II. The Causes Behind Street Vending
Why do we have SV/PKL ? The dominant answer is simple economics. Assuming that sellers
prefer to be legitimate traders, then SV/PKL is a last resort. They exist because of the desperation
of demand and supply. On the demand side SV serve the need of their consumers, mostly the
poor (Bodhikong & Moongjongklang, 2004). PKL do not force people to buy. People decide to
buy at SV, because it is rational. SV offer low price goods sold at razor thin profit margin. In
some sense they subsidize their customers, by working long hours supported by unpaid labor,
usually family members (Nirathron, 2006). Hence street sweepings will only eliminate them
temporarily. Similar to drugs, alcohol and pornography, as long as the demand remains, so shall
SV. They will return, sooner rather than later. Thus repressive measures are deemed counter
productive : lots of casualties on both sides for no apparent gain.
On the supply side the discussion on the root causes of SV must be placed in the context of the
informal sector economics. As discussed in most economics textbooks, the informal sector is
part of the economy that operates beyond the rules and regulations that govern the formal sector
(ILO, 1972; Todaro, 2005). Its size is astonishingly significant in most developing countries,
although it rarely receives the attention that it deserves. It functions as a vessel to accommodate
labor unemployed, for various reasons, in the formal sector. The formal sector more often than
not is represented by relatively modern, high tech, urban employment. It offers higher salary than
the traditional rural employment. Thus cities become magnets that attract rural labor.
Unfortunately for most of the migrating rural (agriculture) workers they do not possess the skills
demanded by modern occupations. Hence they are not employable in the formal sector. To
survive they have no recourse except creating employment using their only asset, themselves.
They mostly cater to the needs of people just above them in the urban social rung (the poor
relying on the less poor). These customers are themselves hanging precariously to their jobs, on
the bottom of the economic ladder, barely surviving on the fringes of the urban formal sector.
They, in turn, cater to the needs of the “real” urbanites, those sufficiently fortunate to possess the
necessary skills required by the modern economy. This last group of people, amazingly, mayhave a living standard comparable to their counterparts in developed countries. (We are forcefully
reminded to Boeke’s dualistic economy thesis). When the words “global economy” are bandied
about, this is the image that world leaders try to project.
Another major cause for rural-urban migration of labor is surplus labor in the rural agriculture
sector. Land does not expand, while population keeps on growing. Thus over time there is
insufficient agricultural land to accommodate all of the rural labor. Also, with technological
progress less labor can manage the land efficiently and produce even more. So, more and more
rural labor is crowded out of the agriculture sector. They have no place to go but to the cities,
hoping to improve their lots. Thus the third world phenomenon of over-urbanization started,
where urban infrastructures are stretched to the limits. Cities become crowded with unrelenting
traffic jams, public spaces are overtaken by squatters, municipalities can no longer provide
adequate amount of clean water, public schools are overloaded, crime rate increases, the air is
polluted, and rivers are contaminated. People see the informal sector growing rapidly, street
vendors encroach first the sidewalks, then the roads. On top of the growing number of vehicles,
on already minimum amount of roads, this encroachment becomes unbearable. So, the people
demand street sweeping of SV and the local governments simply comply.
The newest contributor to the informal sector labor is – surprise ! – the global economy. This is
the negative image that globalization leaders prefer not to underscore. Facing tough import
competition domestic firms cut costs any way they can. The easiest is by outsourcing, contracting
some of the work to the informal sector (ILO, 2005). The informal sector operates with cheaper
labor, due to the nonexistent labor protection : no legal contract (casual work arrangement), no
minimum wage, no health insurance, no unemployment insurance, no work safety standards, can
hire children. What happens to the displaced “formal sector” worker whose jobs are now
outsourced ? Many of them have no choice except to enter the informal sector. In fact, a
significant proportion of the street vendors in several economic researches in Asia and Latin
America used to be employed in the formal sector (Bhowmik, 2003; ILO, 2005 & 2006).
Specifically for Indonesia there is one more reason for the burgeoning of the informal sector and ,
by turn, the inflating numbers of SV in the cities : the unending economic crisis. As we can see
from national statistics, since 1997 the rate of unemployment has been increasing. Starting at 4.7
% (4,197,000 persons) in 1997, it was 10.3 % (10,854,000 persons) in 2005.(See appendices for data statistics on unemployment, poverty and income per capita)
The proportion of the population currently living under the povertyline has also increased relative
to the early 1990’s. Then it was in the 13-14 % range (about 26 million people). After 1997/8
economic and political crisis it was in the 17-18% range (around 36 million people). It also bears
to mind that the BPS method to calculate povertyline (and unemployment) has been criticized as
being a bit too politicized (underestimates). The byword today is “decoupling”, where recovery in
the financial sector is not accompanied by similar recovery in the real sector (BI, 2007). As such,
while some Indonesians have regained their former - precrisis - prosperity, the rate of
unemployment will hardly decrease.
With such dire macroeconomics it is reasonable to expect the size of Indonesian urban informal
sector to expand and the SV “problem” to grow. This is not good news for the majority of
Indonesian city managers and local administrations.
III. A New Perspectives on Street Vendors
While in the beginning some economists held that economic growth will naturally reduce and
finally eliminate the informal sector, based on historical evidence of developed countries, this
“trickle down” view of progress has been replaced. The main-stream view now is that the
informal sector in the developing world deserves direct intervention, if only that the natural
process of reduction takes too much time (Todaro, 2005).
In the new economic perspectives informal sector is viewed positively, as an outlet for human
creativity, as a courageous manifestation of an economy in a survival mode. Workers
participation in the in this sector are now seen as heroes, surviving against the odds. They are
men, women and children simply trying to feed their families to the best of their abilities.
Especially apt for street vendors, they are men, women and children surviving on the tough
streets, eking life on the asphalt jungle.As such repressive urban policy seems to be the wrong tool to set on the problem, if SV is still
seen as a problem.
Their heroics can be summarized as living on the edge of subsistence. According to a recent
research, their profit margin is about 7-8%, but this is a gross rate, since unpaid labor of family
members are not calculated in cost. The net profit margin maybe as low as 1%. Nominally this
profit maybe as low as Rp 960,000/year or Rp 80,000/month (Rina Indiastuti, 2007). How can
anyone survive on this ? Only the poor and the weak will opt for a live such as this. Out there on
the streets, only the toughest survives.
Yet they survive, without government help. In the case of SV, despite being pursued by the
Admin Police (Satpol PP) again and again, despite property seizure, despite “illegal taxes”
(pungli/pungutan liar) demanded by officials and thugs (preman). They exist without legal
protection whatsoever (hence the term, informal sector). Though in the morning they may have
paid their daily tax, in the afternoon the Admin Police may sweep them off all the same. This
happens not only in Indonesia, but all over the cities of the developing countries (Bodhikong &
Moongjongklang, 2004; Nirathron, 2006; ILO, 2006).
According to the International Labor Organization (ILO, 2004), about 6 out of every 10 workers
in Less Developed Countries (LDC) are absorbed by the informal sector. This magnitude makes
the informal sector an important part of the aggregate economy. As such street vendors then make
an important contribution to the urban economy. They should no longer be viewed simply as a
nuisance to be eliminated off the city streets and sidewalks.
Just a year into the crisis, in 1999, the small and medium sized enterprises(SME, practically
dominated by the informal sector) employed 88% of all Indonesian labor. The informal sector
made up about 90% of SME, or about 40 million business units in 2004 (Mubyarto, 7/2004). The
large firms, the ones with hundreds of trillion rupiahs of government credit, collapsed. With their
collapse the owners ran to Singapore with the bulk of this country’s foreign exchange reserves.
After so much pampering, favorable rules and regulation, and “buddy-buddy” treatment, they left
Indonesia leaving foreign debt and poverty in their wake. What were left were SME and the
informal sector, the indigenous economic units that grew with difficulty during the boom era of
the New Order (Orba) regime, against all odds. They survived without government support
(Mubyarto, 3/2004), neither credit nor regulations, but now were relied upon to fuel economicrecovery and growth. In post-crisis West Java, Indonesia, SME absorbed 99% of labor
(10,481,000 persons) as compared to 1% by large firms (76,000 persons). Hence the informal
sector, in this case as part of the SME, is a significant contribution to regional employment. In the
same year, 2000, it was also the largest contributor to gross regional domestic product (GRDP),
amounting to 53.5 %, relative to the share of large firms, 46.5 %. (Sutyastie Remi, 2003). Thus
SME and the informal sector are currently the economic savior of the nation. As of the SV/PKL,
a recent Jakarta research estimated that last year their contribution was around Rp 13 billion/
month (Kompas, 8/13/07). The famous Sunday Morning market at the Gasibu area in Bandung is
estimated to have a transaction volume of about Rp 3 billion for the half morning (Bagdja, 2007).
They also pay, on average between Rp 3,000 to Rp4,000/day for “sanitary and protection” fee,
and there are thousands of SV in the city !(There are about 3,000 PKL in the Gasibu market).
Where do all this money go ? If they ever reach the city coffers it will be a significant amount. It
will be a monetary manifestation of the economic potential of SV. All this information helped
transform people’s perception of the informal sector and the SV. Their image is now one of a
productive contributor to society, a safety valve to channel unemployed labor and a vehicle to
redeem human dignity lost with the loss of jobs during this prolonged economic crisis of
Indonesia.
IV. Best Practices
There is no question that for many people street vendors (SV) are a major nuisance. They obstruct
foot and vehicle traffic, due to their encroachment of sidewalks/pavements and roads. They are
unsightly, due to their slap-dash shelters or booths. Their booths and shelters also reduce air flow
and sun rays. They are dirty and disorderly. However none of these problems defy fixing, if
people really want to fix them. There are examples of well managed SV/PKL that turn them into
an urban asset. They can be organized and regulated, such that they are clean and orderly. They
can be a tourist attraction. They can grow, expand and gradually join the formal sector. Below are
some suggestions to better manage street vendors and examples of best practices collected from
around the world that can be used as policy benchmarks.
1. First and foremost is a change of mindset. People make and enforce policies. Without
the correct attitude with respect to SV/PKL there will not be any sustained policy effort to supportPKL. Thailand (ILO, 2006) and India (ILO, 2007) are good examples of public concerted effort
to support PKL. They now have a comprehensive national policy focusing on street vending
(PKL). People still need to see how this policy is implemented at the local level, but at least the
legal framework is already constructed.
2. Macroeconomics is a necessary factor. The conventional view of “trickle down effect” is
not totally in error. With better economy the need for informal sector employment will be less
and, in turn, there will be less street vendors also (both mobile and static).
3. Development economists have for some time advocated rural development to prevent
rural labor migrating to urban areas. With prosperity in the villages there will be less need to
search for employment in the crowded LDC cities. (Todaro, 2005). Consequently, allocating
scarce capital to the cities to alleviate urban poverty will only attract more rural migration. This is
a classical example of a wrong (economic) policy.
4. Monetary economics supplies a vital ingredient : microfinancing. Commercial banks
have been empirically proven to be unable to support the informal sector. Thus microfinancing is
born and it is hugely popular since Prof. Mohammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank in
Bangladesh were awarded the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize. The Central Bank of Indonesia has
recently (2006) initiated rules to guide microfinancing institutions. Brazil has two examples of
successful microfinancing institutions (ILO, 2005). The PCPP has 30,000 small business units as
borrowers and the SCP has 164,000 clients. Both MFI (micro-finance institutions) are jointly
funded by the public, private sector and foreign donors. The average credit is about $2,000.
5. Microeconomics : in the end the local implementation is what counts. One of the most
difficult obstacles to overcome is bureaucracy. For informal sector participants generally and
street vendors specifically, the cost of bureaucracy is often too dear. They simply cannot afford to
pay the price, so they never can step up to formality.
a) In Peru, the Institute of Liberty and Democracy (ILD) managed to persuade some local
governments to accelerate registration process from 300 to ONE day (!). Since 2004
267,000 micro and small business units have become formal (registered and paying
taxes). Due to the increase in tax revenue municipalities now realize the economic value
of the informal sector. Prior to becoming formal these SME were illegally taxed and themoney never reached the public purse. This is one reason for much of the repressive
urban measures on street vendors : unrealized economic potential. (ILO, 2005)
b) In Lima, Peru, PROMDE (Defenders of Small Business Rights) helped the local
administration to reduce registration steps from 45 to 12. Thus reducing the processing
days from 70 to 1 (!). The number of registered SME has increased, from a stable number
for several years of 1,100 in 1998 to 4,000 in 2000. (ILO, 2005)
c) There are also good examples of SV/PKL management in several cities in Indonesia. The
municipal administration of Jombang (Rojiful Mamduh 8/6/07), Padang and Solo
(Kompas, 6/8/07) are known for good effort on behalf of the PKL, although the road to
success is still full of holes. For these three cities order and timing are the keys to good
PKL management. The street vendors were provided standardized carts. The size of their
lots was also standardized. These create uniformity and order. The carts were then
wheeled in and out at certain times. Roads were closed (off peak hours) and then
reopened (peak hours) at certain times. During off operation periods the carts were neatly
stored somewhere unobtrusive, thus the cities stay clean and the roads incongested.
Although Bandung in general is not known for its order nor cleanliness (regardless of the
city motto of “Bermartabat”), the PKL center around Cilaki and Citarum streets is well
managed (Pikiran Rakyat, 11/4/02). It is successful, because the local government
provides them with a room to trade and they, through their association of street vendors,
police themselves, to maintain sanitation (a difficult undertaking) and to prevent new
vendors from locating in the area (an even more difficult proposition). The latter is
necessary to prevent congestion, which may force the government – by popular demand -
to evict all of them. Other well ordered PKL centers in Bandung are around Cihapit street
(electronics, sports goods and other used merchandise) and Cikapundung Barat (new
discounted magazine and books). In Surabaya the PKL around Masjid Sunan Ampel is
also well ordered. It is a pleasure walking and shopping there. The goods offered remind
visitors of the exotic Middle East. Also well managed are the street vendors around the
Alun-alun (central city park) of Yogyakarta and Surakarta. Both are magnets for tourists.
(Amir Sidharta, 2006).
6. The architecture variable : a large portion of street vendors were originally legitimate
sellers with market stalls. However, when their traditional market (“pasar becek”) was renovated
the new market went up in quality and the stalls were too expensive for them to rent
(Bandung.go.id 7/13/07). The developers seek a high return on their investment and the normalway was to increase rent. Rent increase was only justifiable with higher building quality. So, the
traditional market is now a “mall” and the original tenants are forced out onto the pavements or
sidewalks and the streets. Perhaps it is not too hard to construct simple floor plans for some of the
new market floors, so that the poorer original tenants can still afford the space. A cross-subsidy
scheme may be designed, financed either by the higher quality floors or by the government, or
both. On top of that micro-financing may help the poorerrenters to pay for their lots.
An innovative financing scheme was recently introduced in the spirit of Social Business (Yunus,
2006). Paying monthly installments, a huge sum paid on the first of the month, is infeasible for
SV aspiring to locate in formal markets. In the new micro-finance market-scheme the market
(building) developer allows SV to pay a small amount daily. This is what they are used to do on
the street (“protection money”) and this is something they are able to do. The administrative cost
(collecting small amounts from many sellers/stall tenants) of this financing scheme may be close
to prohibitive, but Bank Pasar (“Market Bank”, now BPD/Bank Pembangunan Daerah – Regional
Development Bank) and the Grameen Bank (in Bangladesh) have been doing it successfully for
many years. So, it can be done. We need more creative economic-architecture ideas such as this.
7. A contribution of urban architecture (city planning) : when urban architectural trend is
toward minimizing private space and maximizing public space, as dictated by the steep increase
of city land prices, it is strange to see municipal administrations sell public lands to big
developers. Every year Indonesian cities see new giant malls, but hardly a new public park.
Money talks and big business gets the land, but poor SV/PKL need space too. It is time for urban
planners to design public spaces accessible for PKL, so that they are not forced to encroach on
pedestrian walks and roadways. It is also time for public administrators to respect those plans.
V. Conclusion
The “problem” of static street vendors or PKL is a problem besieging cities in all LDC. It is part
of a larger problem, the over-urbanization of LDC cities, due to rural-urban migration. The cause
of this migration varies, one of them is an urban development bias, where scarce resources are
channeled to the cities, at the expense of rural economic development.The informal sector, of which street vending is just one component, is a vessel that
accommodateslabor unemployable in the urban formal sector. As such it is not as much a
problem as a solution. People need to revise their perception of the informal sector in general.
Street vendors have a negative image in the view of congested urban road users and pedestrians
crowded out from the sidewalks/pavements. As such people generally support local government
efforts to sweep them off the streets. However repressive municipal policy toward street vendors
(PKL), with the deployment of the Admin Police (Satpol PP), have been shown to be counter
productive. PKL exist because there is a market niche for them. They serve an economic purpose.
As such they are productive. They are an urban asset. They deserve support, not only because
they are part of the poor and the weak.
Sustainable support for SV/PKL (and for the informal sector in general) is only possible if there is
a change of mindset among urban decision makers. Favorable perspectives are the foundation of
good policy. It has been done successfully elsewhere, many times, and Indonesian city managers
have many examples to study from. It is time for all of us to help transform PKL (street vendors)
from city blight into a city attraction, where the poor and the unskilled can contribute
productively to the society and the society supports them to grow into a legitimate formal
business.
“Poverty is not created by poor people. It has been created by … institutions … and policies ...”
Muhammad Yunus, 2006 Nobel Peace LaureateVI. References
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STREET VENDING NOMENCLATURE PHOTOGRAPHS
 Mobile/Dynamic street vendor
o Full mobile street vendor (“tanggul”)
o Partilally mobile street vendor(“tanggul”) Static street vendor
o Cart
o Roll-out carpeto Stand
(This photograph is taken from www.alesklar.worldpress.com)Unemployment, Poverty and Income per capita in Indonesia





1988 2,078,000 30,000,000 3,431,258.61
1989 2,083,000 28,333,333 3,793,736.20
1990 1,952,000 28,133,333 4,050,607.54
1991 2,032,000 27,200,000 4,318,903.13
1992 2,186,000 26,266,667 4,440,281.35
1993 2,246,000 26,333,333 4,675,480.86
1994 3,738,000 25,900,000 4,911,966.50
1995 6,251,000 25,466,667 5,250,704.46
1996 4,408,000 34,500,000 5,646,692.05
1997 4,197,000 49,500,000 6,236,885.59
1998 5,063,000 48,400,000 5,941,168.49
1999 6,030,000 37,500,000 5,596,801.55
2000 5,813,000 38,700,000 6,751,580.23
2001 8,005,000 37,900,000 7,239,819.39
2002 9,132,000 38,400,000 7,069,282.26
2003 9,820,000 37,300,000 7,174,138.31
2004 10,251,000 36,100,000 7,417,782.96
2005 10,854,000 7,960,792.76
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